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The Seventh Amendment and the CISG: Functional Factors
in the Search for a Jury Trial Right
Mark A. Mintz*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods ("CISG") governs the sale of goods between merchants
in countries that are parties to the CISG. 1 When the United States
became a party to the CISG in 1988, its provisions "became part of
the 'law of the [American] Land"' under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. 2 This Article will discuss whether the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial applies to actions that arise
under the CISG. This Article traces the background of the relationship between treaties and Constitutional provisions. Next, this Article
will discuss the history and development of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the Court's decisions in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 3 and City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at

Monterey, Ltd.4 In both cases, the Supreme Court held that functional
factors were determinative in deciding whether or not a jury trial right
existed. 5 This Article will examine the applicability of the Court's
analysis in Markman6 and Del Monte Dunes7 to actions that arise

under the CISG. The Article concludes that regardless of the determination of any historical tests, there are strong legal and policy reasons
to attach the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
* J.D. Tulane Law School, 2007, B.A. Emory University, 2001. The author is currently a law

clerk to the Hon. Carl J. Barbier, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The author would like to thank Professor David V. Snyder for his guidance, and Jami Vibbert for her careful edits. The author would also like to thank Jennifer Kitner for her endless
patience and tireless dedication.
1. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, opened for
signature Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISGI.
2. JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA 2 (2d ed. 2004) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

517
526
See
517
526

U.S. 370 (1996).
U.S. 687 (1999).
Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 720-21; Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-91.
U.S. 370.
U.S. 687.

144

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

II.
A.

[Vol. 6:143

BACKGROUND

Treaty Power of the United States

The Constitution of the United States vests the power to make treaties in the executive branch of the government. 8 The Court has inter-

preted that power to "extend to all proper subjects of negotiations
between our government and other nations." 9 However, the Court has
not defined exactly what it means by "the proper subjects of negotiation between nations." 10 While commentators have speculated on
where the outer limit of the executive's treaty power may lie, the limits certainly include any matter of concern between nations, as contrasted to matters of purely domestic concern.11 The CISG, which
regulates the conduct of American business abroad, seems to fall
within the purview of Congress and its power to regulate foreign com-

merce.1 2 However, given that the agreement regulates contracts for
the sale of goods between merchants in countries that are parties to
the convention, it becomes clear this is a matter of concern between
the nations and, therefore, is a proper subject for the executive's
treaty making power.13
However, notwithstanding the broad power of the executive branch
to make treaties, the Court has made it clear that treaties can neither
violate the Constitution, nor give powers to any governmental branch
beyond those limits prescribed in the Constitution.' 4 Therefore, provisions and interpretations of the CISG cannot legally violate the Con-

stitution. An analysis of whether a particular Constitutional provision
is violated by a treaty involves the same analysis the Court would use

8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
9. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
10. See United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1998).
11. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in ConstitutionalInterpretation,108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1261 n.133 (1995) (noting there
are limits to how far a treaty can go in regulating and changing American law); see also Lue, 134
F.3d at 83-84 (holding that a treaty regulating the treatment of foreign nationals while abroad is
"a matter of central concern among nations," and, therefore, is within the Executive's treaty
making power).
12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. For a more complete discussion of the relationship between Congressional and Presidential authority in the making of treaties, see Tribe, supra note 11, at 1261 n.133. This topic is
beyond the scope of this Article.
14. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) ("[N]o agreement with a foreign nation can confer
power on . . . any . . . branch of Government [sic], which is free from the restraints of the

Constitution.").
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to evaluate the constitutionality of a congressional or executive

action.

15

B.

The Seventh Amendment

The Seventh Amendment provides that "[iln Suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right

of trial by jury shall be preserved.

'16

In general, the purpose of civil

juries is to be the fact-finding body in a trial.' 7 In fact, courts have
held that when there are no facts in dispute, no right to a jury trial
exists at all. 18

In the nineteenth century, when determining whether a jury trial
was required for a particular action, the Court first determined what
was meant by the term "common law."' 9 In Parsons,Justice Story held
the "common law" was distinguishable from actions that arose in eq-

uity or under admiralty jurisdiction. 20 Throughout the rest of the nineteenth century, other courts used the same test, simply distinguishing
21
cases at common law from those in equity or admiralty.
However, in 1935, the Court set forth a new test for determining
what types of cases fell under the purview of the Seventh Amendment.2 2 In what became known as the historical test, the Court, for the
23
first time, focused on the preservation language of the amendment.
In Redman, the Court held that "[t]he right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the English common law when
the amendment was adopted. '24 Therefore, under Redman, a jury trial
15. Cf.id. at 21 (holding that a treaty could not abrogate the right to a jury trial for military
dependents living overseas).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
17. See Coleman v. Comm'r, 791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Even in ordinary litigation, the
Seventh Amendment does not require a jury trial when there are no facts in dispute, and [the
plaintiffs] put none in dispute."); Chisolm v. TransSouth Fin. Corp., 194 F.R.D. 538, 553 n.ll
(E.D. Va. 2000).
18. See cases cited supra note 17.
19. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1830).
20. Id. at 447. Interestingly, Parsonsconsidered the question of whether a suit arising out of
Louisiana's civil law system would be a suit at common law for Seventh Amendment purposes.
Id. at 445. The majority rejected the dissent's textualistic approach to the case, which argued
nothing in the Louisiana case structure resembled a suit at common law, and, therefore, the right
to a jury trial under the Seventh amendment did not exist. See id. at 454-55 (M'Lean, J.,
dissenting).
21. Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh
Amendment Jurisprudence,68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 187 (2000); see, e.g., Root v. Ry. Co.,
105 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1881) (determining whether a patent claim is one at equity or common law
and citing Parsons favorably).
22. Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
23. Id. at 656-57.
24. Id. at 657.
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right only existed if it existed under the English common law in
1791.25

Since Redman, the Court has expanded and refined the historical
test. In Curtis v. Loether, the Court expanded the jury trial right to
statutory causes of action.2 6 Citing Parsons,the Court determined that
the Seventh Amendment applies "to actions enforcing statutory rights
...if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an
action for damages in... courts of law."'27 The Court's ruling in Curtis
invited Seventh Amendment litigants to dig deep into the history of
the common law to determine whether a statute created a right comparable to one at law. In Curtis, the question was whether a jury trial
right existed for a private cause of action under Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968.28 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, determined that the action was one for damages, resembling a tort claim
and similar to many tort actions available at common law.2 9 The Court
approved the appellate court's plunge into the history of the common
law. 30 The appellate court analogized an action for refusing to rent to
a person based on his or her race to one against an English innkeeper
"who refused, without justification, to rent lodgings to a traveler," an
31
action at common law that was tried before a jury.
However, by 1987, the Court began to pull away from the search
through historical tomes. In Tull v. United States, the Court considered
whether a jury trial right existed for actions brought under the Clean
Water Act. 32 In Tull, the United States, in opposing the jury trial right,
analogized the suit as an abatement of a public nuisance, an action
that was not tried before a jury in England. 3 3 On the other side, Tull
25. It is interesting the Court limited the right to that which existed in England in 1791 after
refusing to do so in the nineteenth century. See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441 (1847) (rejecting
the use of English law to determine the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States).
For a more complete discussion of this point, see Moses, supra note 21, at 191-92.
26. 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
27. Id. (citing Parsons, 28 U.S. at 446).
28. Id. at 189-90. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 prohibits discrimination in housing.
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 88 (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
29. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195.
30. Id. at 195 n.10 (citing Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1117 & n.22 (7th Cir. 1972), affd
sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974)).
31. Rogers, 467 F.2d at 1117 & n.22. The Rogers court cited Davies Warehouse Co. v. Brown
for the proposition that English innkeepers who refused to rent without justification were liable
at common law. Id. at 1117 n.22 (citing Davies Warehouse Co. v. Brown, 137 F.2d 201, 207
(Emer. Ct. App. 1943)). The Davies court in turn cited English cases from the mid-nineteenth
century for support. Davies, 137 F.2d at 207 n.20.
32. 481 U.S. 412, 414 (1987).
33. Id. at 420.
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argued that the action was more analogous to an action in debt and,
therefore, required a jury trial under English common law. 34 The
Court refused to determine which analogy was correct, holding, "[w]e
need not rest our conclusion on what has been called an 'abstruse historical' search for the nearest 18th-century analog." 35 The Court continued, holding that the nature of relief sought was more important in
determining the right to a jury trial than was finding an exact histori36
cal analog from eighteenth century England.
Thus, after Tull, the Court followed a two-step process when determining when the Seventh Amendment preserved the right to a jury
trial. First, the Court compared the action to common law actions at
the time of the adoption of the amendment, and, second, the Court
examined the remedy sought to determine whether it was legal or equitable in nature. 37 However, in Tull, the Court made clear the nature
of the remedy sought was the more important aspect of the test. 38
Just three years later, the Court's clear rule fell apart. 39 In Terry, the
Court considered whether a union employee, in an action to receive
lost wages and health benefits due to the union's breach of its duty of
fair representation, was entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment. 40 Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall commanded a
majority of the justices in determining the damages sought in the cases
were legal in nature, as opposed to equitable in nature.4 1 However,
only three justices agreed with Justice Marshall's determination of
which historical analogue of an action against an employer for breach
of the union's duty of fair representation was correct. 42 After deter-

mining the historical analogues were inconclusive, Justice Marshall
34. Id. at 418-19.
35. Id. at 421.
36. Id.
37. See Moses, supra note 21, at 195.
38. Tull, 481 U.S. at 421 ("We reiterate our previously expressed view that characterizing the
relief sought is '[more important' that finding a precisely analogous common-law cause of action
in determining whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial.").
39. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
40. Id. at 562-63.
41. Id. at 570-73.
42. Id. at 565-70. The Union argued the action resembled "a suit brought to vacate an arbitration award because [the employee] seek[s] to set aside the result of the grievance process." Id. at
566. Justice Marshall rejected this analogy. Id. at 566-67. In the alternative, the Union argued the
action resembled "an action by a trust beneficiary against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty,"
which Justice Marshall accepted as an apt comparison. Id. at 567-68. The employees argued the
action resembled a suit for attorney malpractice, a comparison with which Justice Marshall disagreed. Id. at 568-69. However, the Court did determine a breach of fair representation could
resemble a breach of contract action. Id. at 569-70.
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continued on to the examination of the remedies. 43 Although Justice
Marshall did recognize the Court's precedent held the remedies test
was more important than the historical analogue test, it appears Justice Marshall believed that the historical analogue portion of the test
44
could sometimes outweigh the remedies portion of the test.
In contradistinction to Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan wrote separately to propose eliminating the historical analogue test altogether. 45 Justice Brennan, the author of Tull, 46 proposed a test in line
with that case, wherein the only factor to be considered would be
whether the relief sought was legal or equitable in nature. 47 Finally,
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Scalia, concluded
that the historical analogue test should be determinative and Tull
stood for the proposition that only when the historical analogues are
48
in equipoise, as in Tull, should the court consider the remedies test.
Therefore, after Terry, the Court no longer had the consensus exhibited in Tull with regard to the proper test. It was now unclear the
weight historical analogues would have under a Seventh Amendment
analysis. The Supreme Court would add to this confusion in Markman
49
v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
Markman was a patent infringement case. 50 In the case, the plaintiff, Markman, alleged infringement of his patent on a system designed to inventory and track clothing through a dry cleaner's
operation. 51 Markman claimed that Westview Instruments' process for
tracking inventory infringed on his patent. 52 As in many patent infringement cases, the case turned on the meaning of the words used in
the patent claim, that is, language delineating the limits of the inven43. Id. at 570. Justice Marshall noted that the historical analogues "[leave] us in equipoise as
to whether respondents are entitled to a jury trial." Id.
44. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 570 ("Our determination under the first part of the Seventh Amendment analysis is only preliminary."). It is also possible Justice Marshall's analysis of the test was
narrower, determining only when the remedy analysis is in equipoise should the historical analogue test be used. However, if that were the case, there would be no reason to have delved as
deeply as Justice Marshall did into historical analogues, and he would be much more closely
aligned with Justice Stevens' views than otherwise indicated. See id. at 581-84 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
45. Id. at 574-81 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
46. 481 U.S. 412, 414 (1987).
47. Terry, 494 U.S. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
48. See id. at 592 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy found the closest historical analogue of this action was an action in trust. Id. at 585. Therefore, because the Court should not
have been in equipoise over the historical analogue, the Court should not have considered
whether the remedies were equitable or legal in nature. See id. at 584.
49. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
50. Id. at 372.
51. Id. at 374-75.
52. Id.
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tor's rights. 53 The question for the Court was whether the Seventh

Amendment required a jury to properly interpret the words of the
patent claim or whether a judge could determine its meaning as a mat54
ter of law.

In Markman, Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, started
the analysis by stating the Court would use the now familiar historical

test.55 As in previous decisions, the first prong of the historical test
asked whether the cause of action arose in law or in equity at the time
of the adoption of the amendment. 56 However, the Court formulated
a previously unknown version of the second prong of the test. Justice
Souter wrote: "If the action in question belongs in the law category,
we then ask whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury
in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791.". 7 This was the first time the Court separated out the
trial issue in determining whether a party had a jury trial right under

English common law; also, the rule the Court announced was a
58
marked difference from previous articulations of the historical test.

Justice Souter easily determined patent actions descended from actions at common law in eighteenth century England. 59 The more difficult question arose in determining whether the claim construction
question was one that came before English juries in 1791.60 Justice
Souter announced that, despite opinions describing a fact-law distinction, or even a distinction between substance and procedure, "the
sounder course [would be] to classify a mongrel practice (like constru53. Id. at 372, 374. The Court explained:
Characteristically, patent lawsuits ... rest on allegations that the defendant without
authority ma[de], use[d] or [sold the] patented invention .... Victory in an infringement suit requires a finding that the patent claim covers the alleged infringer's product
or process, which in turn necessitates a determination of what the words in the claim
mean.
Id. at 374 (internal quotes omitted).
54. Id. at 372. In general, the interpretation of written documents has been considered a question for the judge, and not for the jury. See Moses, supra note 21, at 218. For a more complete
discussion of this point, and its relationship to contract law in general and the CISG in particular,
see infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
55. Markman, 517 U.S. at 376.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Recall that under Terry and Tull, the second prong of the historical test consisted of a
question of whether the remedies sought were legal in nature or equitable and the subsequent
confusion over which part of the test controlled the inquiry. See supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text.
59. Markman, 517 U.S. at 377.
60. Id. at 378.
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ing a term of art following receipt of evidence) by using the historical
method."61

Thus, Justice Souter devoted a considerable portion of the opinion
analyzing whether eighteenth century cases provided a jury trial right
for patent claim construction. 62 This drawn out historical analysis

sharply contrasted from earlier jurisprudence, which had held the
Court was not as interested in "abstruse historical searches" in order
to determine whether the right to a jury trial exists under the Seventh
Amendment. 63 When the Court failed to find an appropriate historical

analogue for the claim construction, it turned to "existing precedent[,]
...the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries[,] and the statutory policies that ought to be furthered by the allocation." 64 The Court
examined the American precedents and determined, despite cases to

the contrary, precedent did not indicate that juries decided the meaning of claims in patent infringement cases.65 The Court next turned to
functional considerations to determine if a judge or a jury would be

better suited to decide the issue. 66 First, it noted the highly technical
nature of patents, making it more likely that a judge would correctly

interpret the patents, rather than juries. 67 The Court also determined
the jury's function of determining the credibility of experts who testify
about the meaning of words is "subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document, required by the standard

construction rule that a term can be defined only in a way that com'68
ports with the instrument as a whole.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 378-84.
63. See Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987); see also, Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 536 n.10
(1970).
64. Markman, 517 U.S. at 384.
65. Id. at 388. The petitioner cited two cases in support of the proposition that juries determined the meaning of claims in infringement cases. Id. at 385. The Court distinguished both
cases. See id. at 385-88.
66. Id. at 388. Because the Court determined that neither English nor American history required this particular trial decision to be determined by a jury, it is unclear whether the functional factors are necessary to the decision or mere dicta. It seems unnecessary to continue into
the functional factors if the Court determined both American and English precedent point away
from jury trials. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. However, the Court continued its
analysis stating "[wjhere history and precedent provide no clear answers, functional considerations also play their part in the choice between judge and jury to define terms of art." Markman,
517 U.S. at 388.
67. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-89 ("Patent construction in particular is a special occupation,
requiring, like all others, special training and practice. The judge, from his training and discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury; and.., is ...
more likely to be right.., than a jury can be expected to be." (citing Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas.
1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (internal quotations omitted))).
68. Id. at 389.

2007]

THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND THE

CISG

Finally, the Court noted a demonstrable Congressional intent to
promote uniformity in the interpretation of patents. 69 The Court ob-

served the purpose of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
was to "'strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as
' 70
to foster technological growth and industrial innovation.'

Thus, after Markman, Supreme Court jurisprudence indicated that
Seventh Amendment analysis required a court to ask (1) whether the
cause of action was tried at law at the time of the founding, or is analogous to one that was; and (2) whether the particular trial decision
falls to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common law

right as it existed in 1791.71
III.

APPLICABILITY OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT TO THE

A.

CISG

The Nature of the Suit Arising Under the CISG

As a preliminary matter, while actions that arise in contracts are
generally state law claims, actions that arise under the CISG are most
likely to be heard in federal courts. 72 Thus, federal Seventh Amend73
ment analysis is required for nearly all CISG cases.
Of course, Markman applied to patent claims.7 4 However, it is not
that far of a leap from patent claim interpretation to contract interpretation. In fact, it seems one could easily substitute the word patent for
69. Id. at 390.
70. Id. (quoting H.R.REP. No. 97-312, at 20 (1981)).
71. See id. at 376.
72. Some state courts have indicated they have jurisdiction over CISG claims. Cf.Vision Sys.,
Inc. v. EMC Corp., No. 034305BLS, 2005 WL 705107 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2005) (holding
that CISG claims must be dismissed because the adverse parties were not from different countries, but otherwise implying the court would have entertained the CISG claims); KSTP-FM,
L.L.C. v. Specialized Commc'ns, Inc., 602 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (noting the
trial court's decision that the CISG does not confer rights on this particular plaintiff); GPL
Treatment, Ltd., v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 894 P.2d 470, 477 n.4 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (Lesson, J.,
dissenting) (indicating that the Oregon trial court could apply the CISG). Even if the action is
brought in a state court whose long arm statute gives it personal jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant, such defendant may remove the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2005). It is even colorable to
argue that if a foreign plaintiff filed in state court against a forum defendant, the case may be
removed under section 1441(b). Id. § 1441(b) (providing a case may be removed regardless of
the citizenship of the defendant if the case arises under "the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States"). Thus, it is not surprising that the vast majority of CISG cases have appeared in
federal courts. See Pace Law School, Electronic Library on International Commercial Law and
the CISG, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html#us (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
73. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958) (holding cases
decided by a federal court using state law will still use Federal Seventh Amendment analysis to
determine if the cause of action would require a jury trial); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1952) (holding a case arising under the Federal Employer Liability Act required a jury trial even when tried in state court).
74. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).

152

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:143

the word contract in Markman, and very few things would have to be
changed in the analysis. 75 Therefore, in order to determine if and

when the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial for actions that
arise under the CISG, it becomes necessary to understand the nature
of those actions.
American courts tend to treat actions that arise under the CISG as
analogous to actions under the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC"). 7 6 And thus, a jury trial will only be available under the Seventh Amendment if such a trial would be available to state law con-

tract claims decided in a federal court. Continuing with the UCC
analogy, commentators have noted that "[u]nder the historical test,
UCC cases almost always have actual or close historical analogues at
common law, as actions for damages or debt. ' 77 Additionally, the
damages sought in contracts cases are often monetary. 78 This, coupled
with the historical analogues of contracts actions, easily fulfills the two
prongs of the classic historical test. 79 Thus, if the Court simply applied
the historical test before Markman,80 a CISG case, properly analogized to the UCC, would require a jury trial right. 8 '
B.

Applying the Markman Test to the CISG

The next questions are how the Markman decision would apply to

cases that arise under the CISG and whether the Court would apply
Markman in such an action. This Section will determine how
Markman would apply to the CISG. Recall that Markman questioned
75. See Li-Hua Weng, Preamble Interpretation:Clarifyingthe "Giving Life, Meaning and Vitality" Language, 11 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 77, 84 n.59 (2005) (noting claim construction and
contract interpretation have been analogized). The Federal Circuit has rejected the analogy.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996). The Supreme Court did not address that issue in its Markman analysis and, in fact, specifically declined to do so. 517 U.S. at 383 n.9 ("We need not ... consider here whether our
conclusion ... supports a similar result in other types of cases."). See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
76. See Chi. Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir.
2005) (noting "because there is little case law under the CISG," courts look to the UCC when
appropriate for interpretation).
77. Margaret L. Moses, The Jury-Trial Right in the UCC: On a Slippery Slope, 54 SMU L.
REV. 561, 564 (2001).
78. Id.
79. Recall that before Markman, the Court asked (1) whether the action was analogous to
actions brought in common law courts in England in 1791 and (2) whether the remedy sought is
more legal or equitable in nature. See supra notes 23-45 and accompanying text.
80. There are several reasons to believe the Court will not apply the Markman analysis to
actions that arise under the CISG. See infra Part III.B.
81. Recall from Part II that the Court has not made clear which part of the historical test
controls the other. However, because both parts are satisfied in this case, there is no reason to
question which piece is more important. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
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not only whether the action had an historical analogue in eighteenth
century England, but also whether the particular trial decision is one
that must fall to the jury.82 Of course, contract disputes exist on many
different issues. 83 For simplicity, this Article focuses on a hypothetical
dispute between parties regarding contract interpretation. Like
Markman, the hypothetical action involves a disputed contract term,
84
as well as the facts underlying that term.
Under Markman, the first question is whether the cause of action is
one that was tried at common law at the time of the adoption of the
Seventh Amendment. 85 As noted earlier, it is likely a court would
consider actions in contract to be analogous to actions that existed in
common law at the time of the founding. 86 Therefore, as in Markman,
a court is unlikely to have trouble determining whether contract ac87
tions have historical analogues.
The next question under the Markman analysis is whether the particular trial decision is one that was historically allocated to the jury. 88
In Markman, the Court considered the historical evidence of whether
a jury decided patent-claims construction. 8 9 Similarly, the Court
would have to consider whether historically a jury decided questions
of the proper interpretation of contract terms. While it may be unclear
whether interpretations of contract provisions were sent to juries in
England in 1791, the distinction may not matter as much as the Court
indicates. In keeping with its prior precedent, despite its willingness to
do so in Markman, the Court does not favor "abstruse historical"
searches. 90 Nonetheless there is a little evidence to suggest juries did
determine the meaning of contract documents, although this evidence
is far from clear. 91
82. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996).
83. For example, contract disputes could arise on the issue of formation, consideration, or
amount of damages, just to name a few.
84. This would be the closest dispute to the interpretation of patent claims as described in
Markman. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.
85. Id. at 376.
86. Contract actions most often sound in an action for damages or debt. See Moses, supra note
77, at 564.
87. In Markman, the Court had relatively little trouble determining patent cases were tried
before juries at common law. Markman, 517 U.S. at 377.
88. Id. at 376.
89. Id. at 377.
90. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987).
91. See, e.g., Clinton W. Francis, Practice, Strategy, and Institution: Debt Collection in the English Common-Law Courts, 1740-1840, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 807, 811-12 (1986) (noting the vast
majority of contracts cases presented to juries in eighteenth century England involved the issues
of contract formation, as opposed to satisfaction).
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Thus, like in Markman, when the evidence of practices in England

at the time of the founding is unclear, the Court must look to "existing
precedent" to determine if a jury trial is required. 92 On this point,

contract interpretations differ sharply from the patent claim questions
discussed in Markman. Despite the fact that American cases recognize
written documents are left to the courts to interpret, 93 precedent has
long held disputed issues of facts underlying a written document are

the province of the jury.94 Thus, it is also unclear whether the Court
would determine its precedent requires a jury trial based on the underlying facts. In Markman, to prove precedential effect, the Court

took great pains to distinguish the mid-nineteenth century cases
Markman presented. 95 There, of course, is a possibility the Court
would distinguish the long standing tradition in contract interpreta96
tion, but that seems unlikely.
After determining that history and precedent provided no answer to
whether a jury trial right must be preserved, the Markman Court next
considered the functional factors. 97 Thus, there is a question of

whether the functional considerations, as listed in Markman, are mere
dicta in light of the Court's failure to find historical or precedential
evidence that the underlying facts should be submitted to a jury. 98 It is
possible that, under Markman, the historical analogies could trump
any functional considerations, and the Court would conclude the his-

torical analogies force a jury trial although the functional factors argue against one. 99
92. Markman, 517 U.S. at 384.
93. See, e.g., id. at 388-89.
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 (1981); see also, Moses, supra note 21, at
220 & n.273.
95. Markman, 517 U.S. at 385-88.
96. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. But see Moses, supra note 21, at 220 & n.272
(noting the Federal Circuit's precedent indicated the facts underlying claim construction were a
question for the jury). There have not been any cases applying the CISG in the Supreme Court,
and no circuit court cases have applied the jury trial issue in CISG cases. It may be a court would
seize on the distinction between a contract claim and a CISG claim to deny precedential effect to
cases that suggest a jury decides questions as to the underlying facts of document interpretation.
97. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388. See also Moses, supra note 21, at 244.
98. See Scope of Right to a Jury Trial-Patents,110 HARV. L. REV. 266, 276 & n.81 (1996). The
article notes this reading is certainly possible, but argues it is a misinterpretation of the case. Id.
Whether or not it is a misreading is irrelevant to the discussion that follows. See also Moses,
supra note 21, at 238 (questioning whether Part III of the Markman decision was necessary for
the Court's decision); Greg J. Michelson, Did the Markman Court Ignore Fact, Substance, and the
Spirit of the Constitution in Its Rush Toward Uniformity?, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1749, 1763 (1997)
(indicating that policy rationales provide support for the lower court's holding).
99. Of course, the opposite is true as well: that if the functional factors are required for any
Seventh Amendment analysis of particular trial decisions, then functional factors could override
historical and precedential considerations.
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Regardless of the correct path, it is known that when the historical
analogues are unclear, the Court will consider functional factors.1 00
The functional factors considered in Markman included (1) the complexity of the information and (2) the need for uniformity in decision
making. 10 1 We will apply each of these factors, in turn, to the CISG.
The Markman Court determined the "construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges often do and are likely to
do better than jurors. ' '10 2 The Court noted patents are extraordinarily
complex, and the jury's traditional function of evaluating credibility of
witnesses can be handled by judges who seek to "evaluate ... testimony in relation to the overall structure of the [document]."'' 0 3 Likewise, the determination of international sales contracts will be difficult
and complex for juries; jurors will be asked to determine what terms
mean in light of standards in the relevant maiket. 10 4 However, there is
no reason to think international sales contracts would be any more
difficult to understand than domestic sales contracts, for which juries
have been employed for years.'0 5
The second functional factor in Markman is the need for uniformity
in decision making. 10 6 The Markman Court noted that Congress, in
establishing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sought to
increase uniformity and strengthen the patent system. 10 7 Similarly,
Congress evidenced an intention to create uniformity in the interpretation of contracts for sales between international parties when it
adopted the CISG.' 0 8 Congress intended the CISG to create a "uniform legal system to which each party to an international sales contract could refer."' 1 9 Thus, just like with the establishment of the
Federal Circuit, Congress evidenced an intention to have uniform
rules and decisions made for international sales contracts. Further, a
court could find a right under a treaty, such as the CISG, is more
closely aligned to public rights under the patent system than private
contract rights. While unlikely, such an interpretation would provide
additional justification for a curtailment of the jury trial right in an
100. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
101. Id. at 388-90.
102. Id. at 388.
103. Id. at 390.
104. The relevant market may include foreign commercial practices and complex international
business arrangements.
105. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
106. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
107. Id.
108. See InternationalSale of Goods: Hearing on Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 98th Cong. 1 (1984) (statement of Sen. Mathias).
109. Id. at 13 (statement of Sen. Dodd).
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action like the one in question. 110 Hence, just like patent comparisons,
if the Court was so inclined, Markman would provide ample precedent for curtailing the right to a jury trial for questions of fact underlying the construction of written documents arising under the CISG.
IV.

WHY A JURY TRIAL RIGHT APPLIES TO THE

A.

CISG

Supreme Court Jurisprudence

While Markman gives support for the proposition that contract actions do not require a jury trial, there are strong reasons to believe,
while Markman's analysis will be applied outside of the patent context, functional factors will force a court to determine a jury trial right
applies. While some commentators contend Markman does not apply
outside the patent context,"' recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
112
suggests otherwise.
Professor Margaret Moses argues the Markman decision will not
apply outside of patent law at all. 113 She argues "there are three main
reasons why [Markman] is unlikely to have significant precedential
value outside of the patent law area: (1) the specific limiting language
of the decision, (2) inconsistency with the Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence outside the patent area, and (3) the unanimity of
the decision. 11 4 First, Professor Moses notes that the Court specifically held it was not deciding whether its conclusion applied outside of
the patent arena.11 5 Thus, even though the Court limited its holding in
Markman, the Court left open the possibility of expanding its analysis
16
outside the patent area.'
Second, Professor Moses argues Markman is inconsistent with the
Court's traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. 1 7 She argues
the Court was most concerned with a "deference to a congressional
statutory scheme," creating a specialized forum for patent rights,
which the Court considered to be closer to a public right than a private right under contract law. 1 8 Finally, Professor Moses also argues
the unanimity of the decision in Markman belies a feeling by the
Court that it was not significantly changing Seventh Amendment anal110. Cf.Markman, 517 U.S. at 373.
111. Moses, supra note 21, at 244-49.
112. See supra Part III.A.
113. Moses, supra note 21, at 244-49.
114. Id. at 244-45.
115. Id. at 245. "We need not ... consider here whether our conclusion ... supports a similar
result in other types of cases." Id. (quoting Markman, 517 U.S.at 383 n.9 (1996)).
116. Id.
117. Moses, supra note 21, at 246.
118. Id.
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ysis; she contrasts Markman with prior Supreme Court decisions in
this area that were highly contentious among the justices. 119 Under
Professor Moses's arguments, the Supreme Court never intended to
120
apply the analysis in Markman to contract cases.

Later Supreme Court cases gave some indication of the Court's
temperament after Markman. One of the first significant cases after
Markman was Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.' 21 Feltner

concerned whether a jury trial was required for a determination of
statutory damages for copyright infringement.1 22 After determining
the statute itself did not provide a statutory right to a jury trial, Justice
Thomas turned to a constitutional analysis.1 23 Justice Thomas followed the familiar historical test enunciated in Court opinions prior to
Markman.12 4 First, the Court determined whether the action was analogous to those tried before courts of law in England in 1791.125 Having found copyright actions were brought before common law courts
in the late eighteenth century, the Court moved on to the question of
whether the remedies sought were legal or equitable in nature. 126 Justice Thomas followed earlier cases in holding monetary relief was almost always legal in nature and a jury trial right included the right to a
jury to determine the amount of the award. 127 The Court did not mention the Markman decision at all.
Professor Moses used Feltner to show the Court retreated from its
Seventh Amendment analysis in Markman when it used the more
traditional, historic test. 2 8 Although it is true the Feltner Court did
119. Id. at 247.
120. See Moses, supra note 77, at 586-89. But see Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision
on Questions of Fact Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1171-76 (seeing a
consistency in the Markman analysis when viewed in relation to later Supreme Court
jurisprudence).
121. 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
122. Id. at 342. The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that in a suit for infringement, a copyright
owner may elect to recover either statutory damages of an amount between seven hundred fifty
dollars and thirty thousand dollars "as the court considers just," as opposed to actual damages
and profits. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
123. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 347. The Court first determined whether the statutory right granted a
jury trial right on its own in order to ascertain if the Court could avoid deciding the Constitutional question. Id. at 345 (citing Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, 417 n.3 (1987)). The Court held that it
could not discern a congressionally designated right to a jury trial. Id. Likewise, the Court would
have to search the CISG for a statutory right to a jury trial. However, there is no mention of
juries in the CISG, and it is unlikely that the Court would find one.
124. Id. at 348.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 352.
127. Id. at 352-53 (citing Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S.
558, 570 (1990)).
128. See Moses, supra note 21, at 248-50.
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not follow the same analysis as the Markman Court, it is equally plausible the Court decided the issue without reference to the subsidiary
trial issue in Markman simply because there was no subsidiary trial
issue in Feltner. The issue in Feltner was whether a jury or a judge is
the more appropriate decider of the amount of damages in a case; it
did not involve whether a jury or a judge was the more appropriate
decider of the underlying facts of a trial issue. 129 Thus, Markman remains consistent with Feltner: a consistency that is solidified by the
below-discussed Supreme Court case.
In Del Monte Dunes, the Court returned to the Markman analysis.130 In Del Monte Dunes, the Court considered whether a jury trial
right was required for a section 1983 suit asserting a regulatory taking. 131 Like in Markman, the Court asked whether the action was
analogous to one brought in common law courts in England before
asking whether the particular trial decision is one that fell to the
jury. 132 In answering the first question, the Court held section 1983
claims sounded in tort and were more properly associated with legal
relief.1 33 Thus, the Court determined such claims were sufficiently
134
analogous to actions at common law.
Having held this was an action at law, the Court then addressed the
particular issue of whether liability was a decision more appropriate
for the jury or for the judge. 135 As in Markman, the Court considered
history, precedents and functional considerations to determine who
decided the issue of liability. 136 The Court found neither history nor
precedent provided a clear answer to the question and then addressed
functionality. 137 However, the functional factors considered in Del
Monte Dunes were markedly different than those considered in
Markman. In Markman, the Court considered the complexity of the
issue, as well as the need for uniformity in the decision-making process. 138 Yet, this time, the Court focused on a fact-law distinction, determining a regulatory taking case was dependent on the particular
139
facts, and, thus, it was a question for the jury.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Feltner, 523 U.S. at 342.
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708 (1999).
Id. at 707.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 718.
Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 718.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 718-720.
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Professor Moses used the above cases to indicate the Supreme
Court would limit the analysis in Markman to patent areas. 140 Moses's
analysis of Del Monte Dunes leads her to conclude "the majority...
while paying lip service to Markman, in fact applied a much more
traditional approach to the Seventh Amendment. 1 41 Professor Moses
noted Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality in Del Monte Dunes,
recited the Markman test, but subsumed the old historical test within
the first prong of the Markman test. 142 Moses then distinguished the
Del Monte Dunes functionality analysis from the one in Markman,
and she ultimately concluded: "The majority in Del Monte Dunes
made no effort to determine if judges or juries were better suited to
determine particular issues. Rather, the majority noted that because
the issues were factual, they should properly be submitted to the
jury."'1 43 However, Del Monte Dunes stayed faithful to the Markman
analysis in that Markman also subsumed the two steps of the historical
test (nature of the action and nature of the remedy) into the first question. 144 Justice Souter did not need to determine if the monetary damages sought in Markman were legal or equitable in nature since there
was "no dispute that infringement cases today must be tried to a jury,
as their predecessors were more than two centuries ago."' 45 Thus,
there was never really any dispute in Markman about the historical
nature of the patent suits, just the historical nature of jury decisions
about the underlying facts related to claim construction. Moreover,
Moses notes that the functionality considerations in Del Monte Dunes
146
were different from the functionality considerations in Markman.
However, the Markman Court never held the complexity and uni47
formity factors were the only factors that a court should consider. It
was entirely consistent with Markman for the Court to consider a factlaw distinction as one of the functional factors, just as it did in Del
148
Monte Dunes.
Hence, contrary to Professor Moses's claim that cases after
Markman indicate the Supreme Court would limit its analysis in
140. See Moses, supra note 21, at 256.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 253 ("[A]lthough he quoted the Markman version of the ... test, Justice Kennedy
applied traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence by considering both the nature of the
action and the remedy sought.").
143. Id. at 255.
144. Compare Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 718-720, with Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996).
145. Markman, 517 U.S. at 377.
146. See Moses, supra note 21, at 255.
147. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-90.
148. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 718-19.
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Markman to the patent area, it appears the Court considered
Markman to be valid precedent in areas outside patent law.
Lower courts have used Markman outside of the patent context as
well. In Entergy Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska, the State of Nebraska was
accused of not carrying out its duties and acting without good faith
under a nuclear energy compact of which it was a member. 149 The
State of Nebraska appealed the district court finding, claiming, inter
alia, that the district court erred in denying the state a jury trial. 150 The
appellate court had to determine whether the action resembled a common law contract action or whether it was a dispute between sovereigns.15 1 The appellate court used the Markman decision as precedent
for looking into the historical record, recognizing it as valid precedent
152
outside of a patent context.
It is likely the Court would use the Markman analysis on an issue
arising under the CISG, but additional functional considerations
should force the Court to decide in favor of a jury trial right.
B.

Parol Evidence Rule

Regardless of whether a court determines history and precedent require a jury to examine underlying facts to interpret a written document, 153 there are significant functional factors, in addition to the ones
cited in Markman154 and Del Monte Dunes,1 55 that should cause a
court to find a jury trial right. Article 8 of the CISG prohibits the
application of the parol evidence rule in the interpretation of contracts made under the authority of the CISG. 156 In United States
courts, the parol evidence rule prohibits the introduction of evidence
of prior agreements that would contradict terms in an integrated
agreement. 5 7 For example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
considered a case where a Florida tile dealer agreed to buy ceramic
149. Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 358 F.3d 528, 533-34 (8th Cir. 2004).
150. Id. at 534.
151. Id. at 542-43.
152. Id. at 534. Bankruptcy courts even used Markman to determine whether a jury trial right
applies to a challenge of a Chapter Eleven confirmation plan. See In re A.P.I. Inc., 324 B.R. 761,
767-69 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005).
153. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
156. CISG, supra note 1, at art. 8. Article 8(3) provides that a court shall give "due consideration [to] all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the
parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties."

Id.
157.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 213 (1981); see also U.C.C. § 2-202 (1977).
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tile from a manufacturer in Italy. 158 MCC Marble brought suit against

D'Agostino claiming the defendant did not satisfy orders during the
spring and summer of 1991.'- 9 The defendant responded MCC-Marble
160
had defaulted on the contract by not paying for earlier shipments.
Defendant claimed a term found on the reverse side of the contract
allowed it to suspend future deliveries if payment had not been received. 161 MCC-Marble argued it never intended to be bound by the
162
terms on the back of the document.
Both parties submitted affidavits acknowledging they subjectively
did not intend to be bound by terms located on the reverse side of the
contract. 163 However, the defendant contended the parol evidence
rule prevented a previous statement from being used to contradict an
integrated, written contract. 164 The court determined the parol evi-

165
dence rule did not apply to contracts governed under the CISG.
Because the affidavits indicated both parties were aware of the other
side's subjective intent, the court remanded the action to the trial
166
court to find the subjective intent of the parties.
Since the interpretation of a written contract may be based on the
previous statements and subjective intent of the parties involved, history and precedent suggests a jury would be better suited to determine
this information. Even under Markman's complexity-of-the-information functional consideration, needing to find the subjective intent of
the parties would necessitate a jury trial.167 In Markman, the Court
held judges are better suited to determine the credibility of expert
witness testimony because the "credibility determination [would] be
subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole
document, required by the standard construction rule that a term can
be defined only in a way that comports with the instrument as a
whole.' 168 Therefore, the judge would have to determine the subjective intent of the parties involved in addition to determining the credibility of the information presented, a task far removed from simple
document interpretation. Moreover, under the functional considera158. MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.P.A,, 144 F.3d 1384,
1385 (11th Cir. 1998).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1385-86.
162. Id. at 1386.
163. MCC-Marble Ceramic, 144 F.3d at 1386.
164. Id. at 1388.
165. Id. at 1391.
166. Id. at 1392.
167. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996).
168. Id.
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tion in Del Monte Dunes, the fact-law distinction in a case such as this
would also be dispositive. 169 In this case, the factual determination of
the parties' subjective intent is a question better suited for a jury.
Once the judge finds the parol evidence rule does not apply, it becomes a question of fact as to: 1) the subjective intent of the parties
prior to signing the agreement and 2) the extent to which the parties
knew the other parties' intent. Therefore, regardless of a court's determination on the way history and precedent treated contract disputes,
functional considerations, such as those stated in Markman170 and Del
Monte Dunes,17 1 would require contractual provisions under the CISG
to be interpreted by a jury pursuant to Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is no consensus over the status of the Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. However, it is clear that whether the
Court uses a historical test or a more complicated one involving functional considerations, there are strong reasons to afford the right to a
jury trial for actions arising under the CISG.

169. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 718-20 (1999).
170. Markman, 517 U.S. at 391.
171. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 723.

